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Abstract	Why	did	the	United	States,	ranked	as	the	world's	best	prepared	country,	fail	so	dramatically	in	its	response	to	the	COVID-19	pandemic?	Part	of	the	reason	is	the	backdrop	of	a	fragmented	and	largely	market-driven	health	care	system,	part	of	the	reason	is	a	society	marked	by	dramatic	racial	and	economic	inequality,	but	a	key	part	of	the	reason	is	the	structure	of	the	public	health	system.	The	United	States	approach,	which	reflects	the	politics	of	American	federalism,	involves	underinvestment	and	underpreparedness	at	every	level	of	government	except	the	federal.	Effective	response	has	to	be	led	by	the	federal	government.	The	complexity	of	the	federal	government	is	such	that	any	effective	federal	response	must	be	led	by	the	White	House.	If	the	White	House	fails	to	lead,	the	federal	government	will	fail	to	lead	and	the	system	as	a	whole	will	not	be	capable	of	effective	public	health	response.	That	is	exactly	what	happened	in	2020.				---		In	January	2020,	a	consortium	led	by	the	respected	Johns	Hopkins	Center	for	Health	Security	produced	its	Global	Health	Security	Ranking.1	It	evaluated	the	pandemic	preparedness	of	almost	every	country.	While	critical	of	every	country,	it	ranked	the	United	States	as	the	best	prepared	country	to	face	a	pandemic.	President	Donald	Trump	flourished	the	report's	color-coded	map	at	the	February	26th	press	conference.	At	that	same	conference,	he	assured	Americans	that	their	risk	"remains	very	low"	and	that	he	had	taken	"very	good	decisions."2		 By	June	2020,	the	United	States	stood	out	for	one	of	the	worst,	if	not	the	worst,	pandemic	response	of	any	country.	Its	cases	were	high	and	rising,	its	population	confused	and	embroiled	in	partisan	struggles	about	masks	and	physical	distancing,	and	its	president,	desperately	trying	to	change	the	topic	to	economics	and	xenophobia,	was	holding	rallies	in	pandemic	hotspots.	Citizens	of	the	world's	richest	country,	with	supposedly	the	best	
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pandemic	preparedness,	were	very	reasonably	banned	from	travel	to	Europe	on	the	grounds	that	they	would	bring	infection.			 What	happened?		 This	chapter	explains	the	structures	which	made	the	United	States	so	vulnerable	to	the	virus	and	to	Donald	Trump's	leadership.	It	focuses	on	fragmentation,	inequality,	and	the	disruptive	president.			
American	public	health:	Fragmentation	and	federal	leadership	
	Like	everything	in	the	United	States	public	sector,	communicable	disease	control	is	extremely	fragmented.	The	United	States	has	approximately	90,000	governments,	of	which	approximately	18,000	have	public	health	responsibilities.	These	latter	range	from	mosquito	control	districts	with	a	handful	of	staff	to	the	state	of	California,	with	about	40	million	inhabitants,	to	the	federal	government	itself,	with	its	approximately	4.5m	civilian	and	1.3m	military	employees.	As	the	English	constitutional	theorist	Walter	Bagehot	wrote	long	ago:			 “The	English	constitution,	in	a	word,	is	framed	on	the	principle	of	choosing	a	single	sovereign	authority,	and	making	it	good:	the	American,	upon	the	principle	of	having	many	sovereign	authorities,	and	hoping	that	their	multitude	may	atone	for	their	inferiority.”	(1)		Local	governments	in	the	United	States	are	even	more	multitudinous	and	inferior	today	than	they	were	in	1867.	American	local	and	state	government	is	optimized	to	minimize	its	costs,	even	while	enabling	a	wide	variety	of	rent-seeking,	such	as	licensing	and	professional	monopolies	far	more	restrictive	than	the	EU	permits	(2).	They	compete	to		offer	services	to	voters	and	business	at	the	lowest	possible	price.	Many	of	them	are	frankly	predatory,	using	police	as	revenue-generators	through	techniques	such	as	large	fines	for	minor	infractions	
(3).			 There	are	virtues	to	this	competitive	system	if	the	goal	is	to	prevent	excessive	provision	of	public	services	(whatever	that	means	outside	a	tendentious	and	formal	economic	model),	though	the	whole	logic	is	somewhat	invalidated	if	their	approach	to	balancing	tax	revenue	and	services	is	to	escape	the	tradeoff	by	depending	on	predatory	policing	for	revenue.	But	one	thing	is	clear:	the	system	is	not	set	up	for	optimal	local	production	of	public	goods.	It	is	set	up	to	provide	public	goods	such	as	public	health	at	the	lowest	level	that	allows	society	to	function,	and	will	often	err	on	the	side	of	providing	too	little.	Public	goods,	in	the	United	States	even	more	than	in	other	federal	countries,	are	best	and	most	sustainably	produced	by	the	federal	government	(4).			 This	dynamic	is	more	important	because	so	few	parts	of	the	United	States	health	care	system	are	actually	built	to	provide	public	goods.	As	has	been	endlessly	rehearsed	by	comparative	studies,	the	United	States	health	care	system	costs	an	enormous	amount	of	money	to	produce	outcomes	that	are	average	by	international	standards	while	leaving	a	large	number	of	Americans	with	inadequate	or	no	health	insurance	(the	annual	Health	at	a	
Glance	publications	of	the	Organisation	for	Economic	Cooperation	and	Development	are	a	damning	portrayal	of	the	US	health	care	system	compared	to	its	peers,	as	are	the	
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Commonwealth	Fund's	annual	surveys).	Private	and	nonprofit	health	care	providers	respond	to	regulatory	mandates,	lawsuits,	and	payment	systems.	These	highly	imperfect	tools	are	only	part	of	the	toolkit	for	health	policymakers	in	most	systems,	but	in	the	United	States	they	are	most	of	the	toolkit.	The	underlying	problem	for	the	United	States	health	care	system	is	simple	enough	to	see	in	comparative	perspective:	there	is	no	effective	monopsony	purchaser	of	health	care	and	there	is	no	price-setting	mechanism.	Every	other	OECD	health	system	has	these	and	the	endlessly	fascinating	differences	between	system	types	such	as	Bismarckian	and	Beveridgean	systems	are	secondary	to	that	basic	structural	fact	(5) (6).	Combined	with	the	lack	of	commitment	to	universal	health	care	access,	the	result	is	a	health	care	system	focused	on	economic	efficiency	and	revenue.	Predictably	enough,	that	focus	meant	that	it	lacked	resilience	in	the	pandemic,	and	that	the	pandemic	threatened	to	leave	key	areas	such	as	primary	care	seriously	damaged	by	the	lack	of	customers.	That	the	United	States	faced	a	health	care	recession	that	threatened	to	devastate	its	rural	and	primary	health	care	in	the	middle	of	a	pandemic	is	a	testament	to	the	underlying	perversities	of	its	health	policies	and	health	care	sector.			 In	such	a	system,	some	governments,	even	vile	ones,	will	provide	public	health,	whether	as	a	service	to	citizen	in	urban	areas	such	as	New	York	(7)	or	as	a	service	to	businesses	that	require	stable	and	cheap	labor.	But	tax	competition,	balanced	budget	rules	which	make	states	viciously	procyclical	(8),	weak	and	declining	transparency	and	media,	and	anti-government	politicians	all	ensure	underinvestment	in	even	the	biggest,	most	capable,	and	most	progressive	states.	Most	state	and	local	policymakers	will	understand	their	incentives	correctly,	roll	the	dice,	underinvest,	and	assume	that	there	will	be	no	public	health	crisis	for	which	they	can	be	held	accountable.			 As	a	result,	the	dominant	theme	of	the	development	of	public	health	in	the	United	States	has	always	been	the	role	of	the	federal	government.	The	federal	government	has	the	expertise	and	powers	of	suasion	and	leadership	that	can	mobilize	the	rest	of	the	US's	weak	public	health	system,	adding	crucial	expertise	and	making	the	whole	more	than	the	sum	of	its	parts.	And	above	all,	it	has	money	(9, 10).			 Federal	leadership	has	compelling	advantages	in	the	abstract	(as	we	see	in	debates	about	what	the	EU,	while	respecting	subsidiarity,	can	do	better	in	public	health)	(11)	(12).	It	enables	specialism-	CDC	employs	experts	in	almost	any	known	disease,	and	can	rapidly	create	expertise	in	new	ones.	Smaller	countries,	such	as	even	big	EU	member	states,	have	difficulty	justifying	such	investment	(the	solution	is	to	work	with	universities,	but	that	creates	other	complexities).	It	is	efficient-	there	is	no	reason	for	any	other	single	US	government	to	employ	scientists	interested	in	topics	such	as	coronaviruses.	CDC	can	maintain	staff	and	research	all	over	the	world;	the	calculus	for	a	polity	of	ten	million	people	such	as	North	Carolina,	Michigan,	or	Sweden	would	be	different,	and	we	would	absolutely	not	expect	a	small	polity	like	Wyoming,	Vermont,	Rhode	Island,	Cyprus,	Malta	or	Estonia	to	do	things	like	run	a	large	research	station	in	Indonesia.	Size	enables	specialization	and	division	of	labor,	which	can	be	very	helpful.			 In	the	particular	context	of	US	federalism,	where	other	governments'	tax	competition	and	politics	lead	them	to	invest	as	little	as	possible	in	public	health,	federal	leadership	and	resources	are	necessary	to	provide	public	health	when	there	is	a	public	health	emergency	(13)	American	local	governments	are,	structurally,	like	people	who	are	forced	to	build	closely-packed	houses	out	of	flammable	wood	but	enjoy	a	very	good	fire	
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department.	The	problem	for	them	is	that	while	the	fire	department	can	put	out	individual	fires	alone,	in	a	real	crisis	everybody	has	to	join	the	bucket	brigade	(14).	The	CDC	can	manage	individual	outbreaks	well,	but	organizing	a	bucket	brigade	requires	that	everybody	have	buckets,	strength,	and	leadership.	Austerity	policies	driven	by	the	Republican	party	since	2010	had	been	undermining	the	fire	department	as	well	as	that	bucket	brigade.	State	and	local	government	finances	never	left	the	austerity	of	the	financial	crisis,	the	result	has	been	a	decade	of	declining	expenditure	on	public	health	and	related	services	and	a	loss	of	around	a	fifty	of	public	health	jobs	2010-2020.			 In	short:	the	system	was	too	dependent	on	a	CDC	that	was	dependent	on	competent	federal	leadership.	The	federal	role	depends	on	the	ability	to	marshal	the	federal	government.	The	United	States	executive	branch	is	notoriously	complex,	filled	with	fiefdoms	and	agencies	with	their	own	political	and	legal	accountabilities,	and	lines	of	authority	on	paper	that	have	no	relation	to	reality.	To	summarize	a	huge	volume	of	research,	the	result	is	a	system	in	which	coordinated	action	is	only	possible	if	the	White	House	wants	it,	whether	through	the	established	interagency	mechanism	of	the	National	Security	Council	or	an	ad	hoc	"czar"	(10).	Trump's	National	Security	Advisor	John	Bolton	abolished	the	pandemic	preparedness	function	of	the	NSC	that	Obama	had	created.	As	a	result,	there	was	little	central	capacity	to	respond	to	health	emergencies	by	2020.	Powerful	components	of	the	US	government,	from	CDC,	to	the	military	and	emergency	management,	were	never	really	coordinated.			 Thus,	for	example,	it	was	immediately	obvious	that	the	inability	of	the	Food	and	Drug	Administration	and	the	CDC	to	agree	on	procedures	for	testing	in	the	crucial	months	of	March	and	April	reflected	a	failure	of	the	White	House	to	demand	coordination.	Given	the	way	the	Trump	administration	operates,	a	failure	of	coordination	was	a	reasonable	expectation,	but	evidence	immediately	started	to	build	up	that	Trump	was	actively	hindering	response.	Early	in	the	pandemic,	he	made	it	clear	that	he	opposed	testing	because	it	increased	the	numbers	of	reported	cases.3	In	June,	he	told	a	rally	that	“I	said	to	my	people,	‘Slow	the	testing	down,’”4	and	when	his	communications	staff	said	he	was	joking,	he	reaffirmed	it:	"I	don't	kid...By	having	more	tests	we	find	more	cases."5	The	US	federal	failure	could	well	have	been	a	sin	of	commission	as	well	as	the	blatantly	obvious	sin	of	omission,	omission	to	coordinate	the	federal	bureaucracy	in	the	way	only	the	White	House	can	do.			
American	public	health	politics:	Partisanship	and	inequalities		What	politics	produced	this	public	health	system,	in	which	the	federal	government	rose	up	like	a	giant	before	the	world	despite	its	feet	of	clay	at	the	local	and	state	levels?	The	politics	
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of	public	health	in	the	United	States	reflects	its	institutions,	discussed	above,	as	well	as	the	broader	trends	in	its	political	economy	and	society	that	shape	interests	and	party	strategies.			 There	are	two	key	relevant	issues	in	the	American	political	arena.	The	first	is	the	extent	of	partisan	polarization	among	elites	and	in	the	electorate.	By	any	indicator,	federal	and	state	elected	representatives	of	the	two	big	political	parties	no	longer	overlap	on	many	issues;	the	most-right-wing	federal	Democrat	is	to	the	left	of	the	most	left-wing	Republican.	American	political	parties,	long	known	for	ideological	incoherence	and	transactional	behavior,	have	achieved	levels	of	legislative	bloc	voting	and	ideological	decisionmaking	that	rival	parties	in	European	systems	long	known	for	their	well-coordinated	parliamentary	blocks.	Voters	have	taken	the	cue:	to	the	extent	that	an	American	voter	knows	about	politics,	that	voter	is	likely	to	be	partisan	and	ideological.	Voters	who	followed	politics	at	all	were	more	and	more	likely	to	have	adopted	coherent	partisan	views	that	reflected	party	elite	politics	(15).	This	polarization	extended	to	the	level	of	increasing	reluctance	to	accept	a	child's	decision	to	marry	a	partisan	of	the	other	party	(16).		It	was	also	asymmetrical;	Republicans	are	a	much	more	socially	coherent	and	self-consciously	ideological	party	(17).	One	result	has	been	that	Americans	disposed	to	magical	thinking,	conspiracy	theory	and	superstition,	have	sorted	into	the	Republican	party	(18).	Donald	Trump	accelerated	this	polarizing	trend	with	his	skill	at	inserting	himself	into	issues,	making	disparate	news	items,	from	weather	to	sports,	into	stories	about	him	and	his	preferred	issues.			 It	is	a	commonplace	of	electoral	studies	that	partisanship	rests	on	cleavages,	and	a	commonplace	of	American	electoral	studies	that	the	key	American	electoral	cleavage	is	to	do	with	race.	White	superiority,	religious	fundamentalism,	and	patriarchy	form	a	"tryptych"	of	conservative	beliefs	that	dominate	the	south	and	structure	the	Republican	party	as	a	whole	(19).	The	United	States	shares	with	other	societies	shaped	by	slavery	a	particular	kind	of	politics	in	which	racial	divisions	are	the	key	tool	used	to	block	cross-class	racial	coalitions	(20).	Combined	with	a	partisan	political	media,	notably	the	powerful	role	of	the	Murdoch-owned	Fox	News	channel	(21),	the	result	is	that	partisanship	predicts	attention	to	and	understanding	to	public	health	issues	(10, 22).	It	should	be	no	surprise	that	partisanship	predicted	compliance	with	social	distancing,	that	refusal	to	take	public	health	precautions	correlated	with	refusal	to	accept	science	on	other	issues	such	as	global	heating	
(23),	and	that	viewers	of	Murdoch's	Fox	News	network,	especially	specific	hosts,	were	less	likely	to	take	public	health	precautions	(24).			
Donald	Trump:	Denial	and	distraction		Donald	Trump	made	extensive	welfare	chauvinist	(25)	claims	during	his	campaign,	seeming	at	time	to	claim	the	largely	unoccupied	American	political	space	of	an	advocate	for	an	ethnically	exclusionary	but	generous	welfare	state.	In	practice,	though,	he	had	a	strong	preference	for	focusing	his	symbolic	and	programmatic	politics	on	his	core	issues	of	xenophobia	and	racism,	such	as	brutal	border	enforcement	and	massive	restrictions	on	visas	for	legal	immigrants.			 In	this	he	was	not	unlike	other	politicians	of	the	populist	radical	right,	whether	entire	parties	or	individual	politicians	who	draw	on	that	political	repertoire	such	as	Boris	
 6 
Johnson	(Falkenbach	and	Greer,	forthcoming).	It	was	entirely	in	character	with	the	man,	his	political	strategy,	and	his	ethnonationalist	party	to	simply	declare	victory	over	the	virus	and	push	to	re-open	the	country	without	even	masking	or	the	pretense	of	physical	distancing	(e.g.	holding	a	packed	rally	on	June	23	in	Phoenix,	just	when	it	was	clear	that	Arizona's	outbreak	was	completely	out	of	control	and	its	health	systems	about	to	collapse).	Changing	the	topic	to	"LAW	AND	ORDER"	(which	he	tweeted	on	May	31	and	June	6),	immigration	policy,	and	a	putatively	reviving	economy	would	at	least	allow	him	to	excite	his	base	voters	and	shape	the	agenda	in	a	way	beneficial	to	him.			 Trump	came	into	office	at	a	time	when	the	presidentialism	of	the	US	had	created	an	extremely	powerful	and	autonomous	executive	that	legislators	had,	for	a	variety	of	reasons,	little	interest	in	checking	(26, 27).	The	whole	federal	public	health	system	depended	on	the	leadership	of	the	federal	government;	the	federal	government	depended	on	the	leadership	of	the	White	House;	and	the	White	House,	unfortunately,	depended	on	Donald	Trump.		Daniel	Drezner	summarized	the	story	of	US	public	administration	that	led	to	this	situation:		"For	decades,	political	architects	in	both	major	parties	had	worked	at	building	the	presidency	into	the	most	powerful	position	in	the	world.	As	polarization	gripped	Congress,	the	president	was	viewed	as	the	last	adult	in	the	room.	And	then	someone	with	the	emotional	maturity	of	a	small	child	was	elected	to	that	office.	Each	of	the	guardrails	checking	presidential	power	had	eroded	before	Trump	was	elected	president.	Under	the	45th	president,	they	have	almost	completely	disappeared.	As	president,	Donald	Trump	has	acted	like	many	toddlers:	he	is	bad	at	building	structures,	but	fantastic	at	making	a	complete	mess	of	existing	ones."	(28)		There	are,	as	noted	above,	deeper	issues	in	American	politics	and	more	impressive	evolution.	Without	the	increasingly	obvious	shift	from	a	white	majority,	undemocratic	institutions	such	as	the	unrepresentative	Senate	and	Electoral	College,	Republican	jurists'	decisions	that	exacerbate	political	inequality,	the	partisanship	of	Republican	Senators,	or	the	increasing	focus	on	white	identity	of	the	Republican	party,	Donald	Trump	would	not	have	been	in	office	by	March	2020.	But	there	are	accidents	in	history	as	well,	and	Trump's	showmanship	and	strategy	of	ethnic	outbidding	might	have	been	the	necessary	condition	to	take	over	a	Republican	party	uncomfortably	stretched	between	racist	appeals	and	other	electoral	pitches.			
Summary:	Before	the	storm		As	of	January	2020,	then,	before	storm,	we	could	characterize	public	health	politics	in	the	United	States	as	follows:	A	fiercely	competitive	and	often	inept	set	of	state	and	local	governments	were	structurally	inclined	to	underinvest	in	public	health.	Rather	than	change	their	overall	incentives,	the	federal	government	built	an	impressive	apparatus,	especially	CDC,	to	make	up	for	their	deficiencies.	This	was	efficient	and	enabled	American	communicable	disease	control	to	run	smoothly	despite	the	meager	resources	state	and	local	governments	gave	it.	Federal	leadership,	normally	through	CDC,	was	the	center	of	the	system.	Federal	leadership,	
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however,	is	difficult	given	the	difficulty	of	coordinating	the	federal	government.	Coordinating	the	federal	government	requires	an	effective	White	House	or	National	Security	Council.			 If	the	White	House	is	ineffective	or	uninterested	in	solving	the	problem,	then	the	federal	government	will	not	lead.	If	the	federal	government	will	not	lead,	then	the	system	overall	does	not	function.	In	particular,	no	other	actor,	whether	state	or	local,	public	or	private,	has	the	money	and	staff	or	scientific	resources	to	replace	an	inept	or	malign	federal	government.				
Debacle		Unfortunately,	the	president	of	the	United	States	when	COVID-19	hit	was	Donald	Trump.	COVID-19	and	Donald	Trump	were	both	almost	perfectly	adapted	to	exploit	the	problems	of	American	inequalities,	American	politics,	and	American	public	policy.			
Inequalities		As	sociologist	Tressie	Cottom	succinctly	put	it	in	March,	"wealth	is	the	vector"		(29).	By	late	April,	though,	it	was	clear	that	pre-existing	social,	economic,	racial	and	health	inequalities	would	shape	its	effects	on	people	and	society.	Once	endemic	in	an	area,	COVID-19	quickly	became	a	disaster	for,	poorer	people	and	in	particular	people	of	color	(30).		 Morbidity	and	mortality	were	grotesquely	disproportionate:	by	late	June,	CDC	was	reporting	that	Native	Americans,	Alaskan	natives,	and	Blacks	were	approximately	five	times	more	likely	to	be	hospitalized	for	COVID-19	than	non-hispanic	whites,	and	hispanics	were	four	times	more	likely.	Put	another	way,	Blacks	are	13%	of	the	US	population	but	as	of	the	end	of	June	23%	of	the	people	who	died	of	COVID-19	whose	race	was	recorded	were	Black.	Wisconsin	is	6%	Black	but	27%	of	recorded	deaths	due	to	COVID-19	were	Black	people.		Michigan	is	14%	Black,	but	21%	of	the	cases	and	42%	people	whose	deaths	were	attributed	to	COVID-19	were	Black	as	of	the	end	of	May.	Many	of	the	states	known	for	the	worst	health	and	other	inequalities	were	not	publishing	data	on	COVID-19	that	allowed	us	to	understand	the	demographics	of	people	with	the	disease	and	people	who	died	from	it.	It	is	clear	that	much	of	the	South	had	particularly	bad	outbreaks	and	mortality	in	black	communities,	e.g.	in	Georgia	and	Louisiana,	but	the	states	make	it	impossible	to	quantify	the	disparities.	Some	states,	such	as	Georgia	and	Florida,	were	openly	manipulating	their	statistics	and	presentations	to	minimize	the	scale	of	the	outbreak.			 The	reasons	were	no	surprise	to	inequalities	researchers	(30)	(31).	First,	race	predicted	exposure	via	the	job	market	and	living	conditions.	People	of	color	were	more	likely	to	work	in	low-wage	service	sector	jobs	that	demanded	contact	with	the	public.	Many	of	these	were	deemed	"essential"	and	continued	during	lockdowns,	such	as	supermarket	clerks	or	bus	drivers.	Many	of	them	worked	in	health	care,	where	tasks	such	as	cleaning	rooms	were	obviously	dangerous.	The	agricultural	workforce,	including	people	employed	in	the	country's	poorly	regulated	abbatoirs,	is	disproportionately	Latino	and	highly	exposed.			 In	terms	of	risk	factors	for	becoming	sicker	(e.g.	requiring	hospitalization),	the	same	inequalities	were	at	work.	Residential	segregation	meant	that	exposure	to	a	variety	of	
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contaminants	was	higher,	which	meant	that	risk	factors	such	as	asthma	were	much	more	prevalent	among	Blacks	and	Latinos.	Thus,	for	example,	the	shocking	outbreak	among	the	Navajo	Nation	in	spring	2020	was	partly	due	to	extended	and	mutually	supportive	intergenerational	families-	exacerbated	by	the	widespread	lack	of	clean	water	supplies	that	even	a	cursory	reading	of	American	history	would	lead	an	observer	to	expect.	Residents	of	the	poor	and	mostly	Black	town	of	Flint,	Michigan,	still	did	not	all	have	safe	drinking	water,	and	many	others	had	been	cut	off	from	water	for	unpaid	bills,	which	made	it	hard	to	obey	calls	for	constant	handwashing.	As	the	Black	Lives	Matter	movement	has	communicated	clearly,	racism	in	American	society	simply	puts	more	daily	stress	on	people	of	color	and	that	translates	into	greater	susceptibility	to	a	wide	range	of	health	problems	(32).	An	uneventful	interaction	with	police,	for	example,	is	much	more	stressful	for	Blacks	than	for	whites.			 Access	to	health	care,	then,	is	problematic.	The	United	States	has	a	long	history	of	discrimination	in	health	care	provision	that	is	by	no	means	over	.	Nonwhite	Americans	are	more	likely	to	lack	health	insurance	or	stable	health	care	providers.	In	rural	areas,	where	health	care	infrastructure	is	increasingly	poor,	health	systems	lack	capacity	and	are	easily	overwhelmed	(e.g.	with	the	early	outbreak	in	majority-Black	poor	counties	in	southwestern	Georgia).	States	that	did	not	expand	Medicaid	have	the	worst	health	care	access	problems;	they	are	also	among	the	poorest,	most	unequal,	and	have	large	Black	populations	and	highly	racialized	politics.	A	legacy	of	discrimination	in	health	research	also	means	many	Blacks	and	other	people	of	color	have	less	trust	in	health	care	providers	(33) (34) (35).			 The	result	was	predictable	enough:	by	mid-June,	31%	of	Black	Americans	surveyed	reported	that	they	knew	somebody	who	had	died	of	the	virus,	as	against	only	9%	of	whites6.	In	the	lived	experience	of	many	well-off	American	whites,	COVID-19	was	simply	not	their	problem,	but	lockdown	and	the	economic	slowdown	were.	It	is	unsurprising	that	Republican	leaders,	including	ones	who	had	initially	defied	Trump	and	taken	strong	measures,	sped	to	undo	lockdown	and	"reopen"	their	states	even	when	epidemiological,	public	health,	and	health	care	infrastructure	data	all	suggested	it	was	a	bad	idea	(36).		Scholars	of	public	opinion	will	have	an	urgent	and	difficult	research	task	working	out	how	the	burden	of	COVID-19	was	understood	by	different	voters,	and	how	that	fed	into	their	views	about	appropriate	responses.				
Fragmentation		
	The	simple	axiom	of	American	public	health	emergency	management	is	that	the	system,	to	work,	requires	federal	leadership	and	federal	leadership,	to	work,	requires	White	House	leadership.	If	the	White	House	refuses	to	lead,	or	cannot	lead,	then	the	federal	government	will	not	play	the	leading	role	written	for	it	and	state	or	local	governments	will	have	to	figure	it	out	as	they	go	along.	That	is	exactly	what	happened.	The	result	was	a	federal	COVID-19	plan	that	was	quickly	abandoned,	the	sidelining	of	CDC,	a	corrupt	free-for-all	in	
 
6 https://www.washingtonpost.com/health/almost-one-third-of-black-americans-know-someone-
who-died-of-covid-19-survey-shows/2020/06/25/3ec1d4b2-b563-11ea-aca5-
ebb63d27e1ff_story.html 
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personal	protective	and	medical	equipment	markets,	and	failure	to	take	advantage	of	the	months	that	the	March-April	lockdowns	bought.	The	federal	government	did	not	just	fail	to	coordinate	and	show	leadership;	it	actively	interfered	with	the	efforts	of	state	and	private	actors	to	do	basic	tasks	like	buy	equipment.			 This	left	it	up	to	states.	States,	in	US	public	health	law,	have	the	crucial	"police	power"	to	regulate	behavior.	It	is	states	that	can	order	businesses	to	close	or	people	to	wear	masks.	But	despite	their	often	impressive	professionalism,	they	are	also	structurally	without	relevant	resources.	Much	of	their	public	health	is	Mätzke's	underfunded	bucket	brigade	rather	than	the	well	funded	federal	fire	brigade	work.	Many	have	gerrymandered	electoral	systems	that	mean	that	they	have	Republican	legislative	majorities	despite	large	Democratic	majorities	in	the	popular	vote	(Wisconsin,	Michigan).	All,	effectively,	have	balanced	budget	rules	that	mean	they	cannot	run	deficits;	the	result	is	that	they	are	procyclical,	and	can	neither	spend	to	compensate	for	downturns	nor	even	spend	in	a	downturn.	State	budget	planners,	faced	with	unprecedented	revenue	declines,	were	hardly	able	to	rapidly	build	public	health	capacity.			 Almost	mathematically,	devolving	a	function	to	states	creates	more	divergence	(37)	
(38).	Letting	different	jurisdictions	do	different	things	produces	different	outcomes,	and	to	the	extent	that	they	must	raise	the	revenue	to	do	it,	they	will	be	more	different	still.		By	late	March,	governors	and	health	systems	began	to	realize	that	they	would	not	have	federal	help,	and	began	to	suspect	that	the	federal	government	was	being	used	by	the	Trump	White	House	for	corrupt	purposes	(39).	They	responded	by	coordinating	with	each	other	(and	areas	of	the	federal	government	less	affected	by	Trump,	such	as	the	military)-	developing	what	amounted	to	small	spontaneous	confederacies.			 In	other	words,	the	executive-federal	system	failed	because	the	federal	executive	failed.	The	result	is	a	complete	failure	to	contain	the	virus,	coupled	with	constant	attempts	to	distract	from	the	problem	and	corruption	and	incompetence	in	the	response.	Federalism	produced	a	partial	solution	as	under-resourced	governors	realized	that	they	were	on	their	own	and	began	to	exercise	leadership.	Federalism	has	a	bad	reputation	in	public	health	circles	because	it	incentivizes	egotism	and	makes	coordination	difficult,	but	in	federations	with	dysfunctional	executives,	such	as	Brazil	and	the	United	States,	it	has	allowed	some	public	health	leadership	(26).	Predictably	enough,	though,	partisanship	rather	than	epidemiology,	population	health,	or	other	factors	drove	state	political	decisions	(40).			 On	the	brighter	side,	the	United	States	quite	unexpectedly	got	the	right	ideas	in	social	policy.	Social	and	economic	policy	such	as	unemployment	insurance	and	payroll	subsidies	(kurzarbeit)	to	employers	are	crucial	to	keep	both	businesses	and	people	afloat	in	crisis.	A	hastily	passed	series	of	economic	and	social	measures	did	just	that,	with	a	mixture	of	subsidies	to	industries	(e.g.	airlines),	enhanced	unemployment	insurance,	and	flat	payments	to	Americans.	There	are	significant	data	problems	at	the	time	of	writing,	but	it	appears	that	spring	2020	saw	both	the	most	dramatic	job	losses	in	the	history	of	American	economic	statistics-	and	a	double-digit	drop	in	poverty.	While	many	Americans	understandably	focused	on	the	enormous	sums	of	money	handed	out	by	the	Trump	administration	with	no	oversight	or	criteria,	the	policies	worked	as	a	broad	stimulus.	Reducing	poverty	by	a	large	margin	in	the	context	of	an	economic	collapse	on	a	scale	known	to	no	adult	was	impressive.		
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Partisanship		As	many	commentators	had	remarked,	Trump	was	lucky	in	that	most	of	the	crises	he	faced	were	of	his	own	making,	and	he	could	end	them	if	he	stopped	making	them.	Regardless	of	the	increasing	the	challenges	the	US	faced,	the	agenda-dominating	issues	of	Trump's	first	three	years	were	largely	problems	he	created	and	extinguished	as	he	chose.	COVID-19	and	the	global	economic	shutdown	were	different.	They	exposed	his	and	his	party's	fundamental	unseriousness	about	public	health	or	disasters,	an	unseriousness	that	was	easily	predictable	by	looking	at	the	priorities	of	its	key	donors	and	voters.	In	the	biggest	disasters	of	his	term	before	COVID-19,	the	hurricanes	of	2017,	his	administration	mainly	distinguished	itself	for	effectively	ignoring	Puerto	Rico,	with	thousands	of	deaths	and	a	migratory	outflow	as	a	result	(41).			 When	COVID-19	hit,	Trump	pursued	a	base-focused	strategy	that	research	on	the	polarization	of	American	politics	suggested	would	work.		Trump	said,	and	made	it	clear,	that	he	had	slowed	down	testing	in	order	to	reduce	COVID-19	test	numbers.	This	strange	nominalism	affected	Republican	policymakers	in	multiple	state	governments	as	well.	They	appeared	to	believe	that	policies	to	reduce	positive	COVID-19	tests	would	somehow	be	equivalent	to	having	fewer	sick	people,	that	changing	statistics	on	hospital	usage	would	somehow	affect	hospitalizations	(as	in	Florida),	or	that	"reopening"	strategies	which	forced	laid-off	employees	back	to	work	and	off	of	unemployment	insurance	would	obscure	a	nearly	unprecedented	depression.	American	voters	today	are	stably	and	highly	polarized	by	party,	prone	to	motivated	reasoning,	and	tend	to	interpret	events	in	a	manner	that	is	both	partisan	(42)	and	myopic	(43).	It	is	nonetheless	very	hard	to	imagine	that	a	pandemic	which	kills	tens	of	thousands	of	people	a	month	and	double-digit	unemployment	in	a	country	with	a	limited	safety	net,	can	be	hidden	by	a	redefinition	of	intensive	care	or	the	creation	of	administrative	burdens	on	those	who	want	tests.			
Possible	futures		As	of	late	June	2020,	the	United	States	probably	has	the	world's	worst	outbreak	of	COVID-19	and	certainly	has	the	worst	outbreak	in	a	rich	country.	Cases	are	rising	in	many	of	the	states,	and	many	major	states	have	quite	clearly	and	predictably	lost	control	of	the	situation.		 There	is	no	reason	to	put	much	stock	in	the	prediction	of	any	analyst	at	this	point.	If	there	is	a	guideline,	it	is	probably	that	an	analyst	who	makes	big	predictions	should	not	be	trusted.	The	scale	of	the	disease	has	no	precedent	in	the	last	century	of	American	history.	The	scale	of	the	economic	collapse	has	no	precedent	in	the	last	90	years	of	American	history.	The	scale	of	the	federal	response	has	no	precedent	in	the	last	90	years	of	American	history.	The	president	arguably	has	no	precedent	in	American	history.			 In	terms	of	public	health,	the	United	States	had	by	late	June	suffered	as	many	casualties	as	its	armed	forces	saw	in	World	War	I	(116,500	casualties).	It	seems	highly	unlikely	that	the	US	will	adopt	any	policy	trajectory	before	2021	that	avoids	massive	casualties.	In	late	June,	it	was	seeing	a	bit	less	than	600	COVID-attributable	deaths	a	day,	but	since	deaths	lag	infection	by	about	a	month	the	rising	number	of	cases	and	test	
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positivity	rates	suggest	mortality	will	rise.	In	most	countries,	it	is	wise	to	avoid	data	about	COVID	attribution	since	it	is	subject	to	problems	from	limited	testing	and	data	problems	and	which	will	tend	to	be	an	undercount.	It	is	better,	for	scientific	purposes,	to	focus	on	"excess	mortality"	which	is	simply	the	difference	between	the	number	of	deaths	on	a	given	day	and	the	number	of	deaths	on	average	on	that	day	in	years	past.	Excess	mortality	data	is	robust	(it	is	hard	to	hide	dead	bodies)	but	tends	to	be	slow.	It	shows	that	the	United	States	had	about	122,300	excess	deaths	by	June	23rd	and	the	epidemic	was	out	of	control	in	much	of	the	country.			 The	United	States	is	therefore	very	likely	to	experience	at	least	one	September	11th	(2,977	deaths)	per	week,	and	a	Vietnam	war	(c.	58,000	dead)	every	few	months	for	the	rest	of	2020.	We	simply	do	not	know	how	American	voters,	however	polarized	and	partisan	they	may	be,	will	respond	to	that,	any	more	than	we	could	have	known	the	impact	of	the	Vietnam	war	in	its	first	few	months.			 Nor	do	we	know	which	voters	will	face	the	consequences	of	the	federal	failure	or	will	be	seen	to	face	those	consequences.	While	wealth	is	the	vector	and	inequality	to	predictor	of	suffering	to	date,	if	risky	behavior	continues	to	become	a	badge	of	identity	among	conservative	white	people,	their	behavior	might	change	the	profile	of	the	epidemic	considerably.	A	pandemic	that	looks	like	a	problem	for	people	of	color	in	Detroit,	New	Orleans,	and	New	York-	the	situation	in	late	spring-	will	have	very	different	valence	in	American	politics	to	a	pandemic	that	is	striking	conservative	suburban	or	rural	white	populations	precisely	because	of	behavior	such	as	unsafe	churchgoing.			 This	means	that	the	duration	of	the	test	matters	greatly.	Enormous	exertions	in	March,	April,	and	May	appeared	to	damp	down	the	epidemic,	leading	to	hasty	and	ill-advised	re-openings	and	a	surge	of	infections	in	southern	and	southwestern	states	with	particularly	bad	health	inequalities,	particularly	bad	population	health,	and	Republican	governors.	What	will	several	more	such	rolling	waves	of	infection	and	crisis	do?	Will	the	federal	government	respond	with	anything	like	the	level	of	support	for	individuals	and	businesses	that	it	initially	did	(or	with	the	same,	impressively	large,	opportunities	for	executive	branch	corruption)?	Will	Republican	politicians	continue	to	take	their	lead	from	Donald	Trump	or	will	they	begin	to	hedge	their	bets	as	they	see	him	founder?	For	example,	they	could	revert	to	their	behavior	of	March	and	April.	In	those	months	they	had	no	clear	partisan	message	on	public	health	measures	and	their	federal	representatives	voted	for	stupefyingly	large	federal	aid	to	sustain	the	economy.	American	state	and	local	governments,	many	of	them	led	by	Republicans,	are	seeing	enormous	budget	shortfalls	now.			 Major	new	federal	economic	assistance	seems	likely,	but	its	direction	will	matter.	What	will	it	do	for	state	and	local	governments?	What	will	it	do	for	precarious	workers?	Will	it	continue	its	generosity	to	the	unemployed?	When	will	American	elites	understand	that	the	failure	to	contain	the	pandemic	at	all	means	that	most	of	the	live	entertainment,	bar,	restaurant,	travel,	sports,	higher	education	and	other	sectors	will	lose	their	economic	viability	unless	given	a	long-term	bailout	of	at	least	a	year?	And	what	will	they	do	when	they	realize	that?	Interest	rates	on	federal	debt	remain	so	low	that	the	federal	government	could	just	keep	these	sectors	in	a	medically	induced	coma	for	years.	It	could,	but	will	it?		 The	federal	government	under	Trump	had,	as	of	mid-June,	placed	all	its	bets	on	the	technological	solution	of	a	vaccine.	Having	bungled	essentially	every	element	of	pandemic	response,	the	White	House,	in	true	American	fashion,	hoped	that	technology	would	help.	
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Operation	Warp	Speed	is	an	effort	to	test	and	distribute	a	vaccine	faster	than	has	ever	happened-	by	the	end	of	2020.	There	are	a	number	of	seriously	alarming	issues.	The	first	is	that	it	might	not	work	and	there	might	not	be	a	valid	Warp	Speed	vaccine	by	the	end	of	the	year,	in	which	case	the	abandonment	of	other	public	health	measures	by	the	federal	government	will	condemn	Americans	to	a	widely	circulating	disease	and	prolonged	international	isolation.	The	second	is	that	the	vaccine	might	work	in	some	sense	but	might	be	dangerous.	Until	now,	the	fastest	vaccine	development	had	been	the	mumps	vaccine,	which	took	about	four	years.	Vaccines	can	have	unpredictable	effects	over	time	and	people;	they	can	interact	with	other	issues	to	produce	health	problems	in	healthy	people,	they	can	have	negative	effects	over	time	that	short	trials	do	not	identify,	and	they	can	even	make	the	illness	worse	for	those	who	catch	the	virus.	The	purpose	of	clinical	trials	is	to	identify	these	problems-	and	send	designers	back	to	their	labs	if	the	problems	cannot	be	remedied.	That	takes	time;	a	side	effect	that	takes	time,	or	even	infection,	to	arise	might	not	be	identified	for	a	few	years.	A	hasty	trial	could	create	public	health	problems	on	its	own,	and	a	hastily	trialled	vaccine	that	turned	out	later	to	have	side	effects	could	create	serious	public	health	problems	once	it	was	being	widely	distributed.	These	two	major	questions,	which	arise	because	of	the	haste	with	which	the	vaccine	is	being	developed,	will	play	into	a	third	major	issue,	which	is	vaccine	hesitancy.	The	United	States,	like	much	of	the	west,	has	problems	of	both	vaccine	hesitancy	and	a	strange	social	movement	opposed	entirely	to	vaccines.	Vaccine	hesitancy	might	be	especially	high,	and	the	opportunity	for	anti-vaccination	groups	especially	big,	if	a	vaccine	is	trialled	or	brought	to	market	so	quickly-	still	more	since	likely	vaccines	are	made	with	synthetic	biology	techniques	whose	public	acceptance	is	far	from	clear	(44)	(45).	There	might	be	tremendous	reticence	or	backlash.	Even	well-informed	and	generally	pro-vaccination	people	with	understanding	of	the	science	and	statistics	might	choose	to	avoid	a	vaccine	that	was	being	administered	with	far	less	trial	data	than	usual.	Fourth,	if	a	questionable	vaccine	is	being	distributed	(even	in	the	context	of	an	immense	"trial"),	there	will	be	huge	political	and	ethical	questions	about	who	is	obliged	to	get	the	vaccine.	If	white-collar	workers	are	allowed	to	continue	working	from	home,	isolated	and	unvaccinated,	while	service	workers	are	obliged	to	get	the	vaccine	and	keep	working,	both	fears	and	any	real	problems	with	the	vaccine	will	produce	a	political	brew	of	rare	toxicity.	Fifth	and	finally,	a	vaccine-focused	strategy	with	no	public	health	component-	which	is	where	much	of	the	US	is	headed-	depends	on	the	United	States	being	able	to	buy	and	distribute	the	vaccine.	There	is	simply	no	guarantee	that	the	US	will	be	able	to	do	that.	If	a	Chinese	or	European	or	other	company	develops	the	vaccine,	or	even	if	it	is	manufactured	outside	the	US,	the	United	States	might	find	it	is	not	at	the	front	of	the	queue	to	buy	hundreds	of	millions	of	doses.	The	loud	egotism	of	the	Trump	administration	might	have	made	such	an	outcome	more	likely,	but	the	incentives	to	national	selfishness	and	power	politics	in	this	case	are	so	immense	(46)	as	to	actually	make	it	less	likely	that	Trumpian	boorishness	does	extra	damage.	In	short,	it	is	hardly	surprising	that	the	Trump	administration	has	found	itself	betting	on	an	extraordinary	and	high-risk	technological	feat	or	even	giving	the	project	a	gauche	name	from	1970s	science	fiction.	It	would	also	be	surprising	if	it	were	to	work.			 Operation	Warp	Speed	could	change	the	development	of	the	pandemic	and	its	politics	in	many	different	ways,	whether	by	saving	us	all	or	creating	a	new	public	health	disaster,	or	it	could	simply	fall	by	the	wayside.	There	are	too	many	imponderables	to	
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predict.	It	is	not	clear	whether	there	will	be	anything	like	a	free	and	fair	nationwide	election	in	November	2020.	It	is	not	clear	what	the	reaction	of	the	militant	white	nationalist	right	or	Donald	Trump	to	a	Democratic	victory	would	be.	It	is	not	clear	what	Donald	Trump	or	his	party	would	do	were	either	voters	or	institutional	dysfunction	to	grant	him	a	second	term	(the	Republican	party	is	re-using	its	2016	platform	for	2020).	It	is	not	clear	what	the	responses	of	the	many	social	movements	aligned	with	the	Democratic	party	would	be	to	a	second	Trump	administration	either.	We	just	do	not	know	enough	about	the	disease,	the	economy,	the	voters,	or	the	political	actors	to	predict	the	overall	outcome	by	the	end	of	2020,	let	alone	2021.	What	we	can	say	is	that	the	comprehensive	failure	of	the	federal	government	caused	cascading	failures	in	the	first	half	of	2020	which	have	led	to	the	United	States'	lethal	and	unpredictable	situation.			
Lessons	for	others	about	the	United	States	
	Spare	a	thought	for	American	citizens,	finally.	At	each	stage	in	this	debacle,	they	have	been	let	down.	A	system	premised	on	federal	leadership	and	good	sense,	which	requires	presidential	leadership	and	good	sense,	was	in	the	hands	of	Donald	Trump.	Trump's	election	reflected	a	series	of	failures	by	party	elites	and	institutions	that	were	supposed	to	block	demagogues	and	ensure	the	will	of	the	electorate	and	instead	enabled	a	demagogue	who	had	lost	the	popular	vote	by	a	large	margin.	In	a	country	that	had	increasingly	focused	power	and	autonomy	in	the	federal	executive,	elite	failures	led	to	a	situation	in	which	a	system	that	requires	a	grown-up	in	the	White	House	confronted	an	enormous	crisis	with	a	toddler	in	charge.		
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